

## **GLOBALIZATION AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION**

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### **Abstract**

**In this article the authors consider the interplay between conflict and globalization, arguing that the interaction between globalization and conflict is complex. While much has been written on how globalization generates or accentuates conflict little has been written on how conflict and globalization interact to produce both positive and negative results.**

### **Introduction**

Theorists and practitioners in many fields are coming to terms with globalization, though perhaps with varying success. Later than some, scholars of peace and conflict resolution have begun to ask what globalization means to them. Though promising, this is a challenging task since the subject is, at best, multi-dimensional, and at worse, several distinct processes. Or, put another way, in the world today there are a number of globalization “discourses”, and there may, in fact, be several different “globalizations”.

Many view globalization as a source of, or contributing factor to, conflict (Attali, 1991; Barber, 1995; Lerche, 1998; Scholte, 1997; Waters, 1995); and there are numerous case studies of the destabilizing impact of economic and cultural forces, radiating from the West, on local politics and culture in such places as Iran, Sierra Leone, or Indonesia (among others). Yet, this is a one-sided view of globalization and conflict, and the true relationship is more complex and subtle. For instance, one author, (Lerche, 1998: 47) while conceding that “...globalization is often disruptive and inequitable in its effects...”and that it has “...posed new challenges for existing public institutions...”; suggests that it has also, paradoxically, opened avenues for the excluded and marginalized to organize and protest against “...its subordinating and homogenizing force.” In a somewhat similar vein we argue that the relationship between globalization and conflict is complex in ways not heretofore fully discussed in the literature.

Globalization, understood broadly, is an accelerator of social change, and as such, may act as a catalyst for conflict, aggravating the tensions in any given society and even creating new ones. At the same time, it may also catalyze and accelerate conflict

resolution. Thus the intensifying interconnectedness which characterizes globalization has unintended consequences for both conflict and peace processes; and here we explore this theme in some depth. After defining what we mean by globalization, we go on to examine its relationship with conflict and its interaction with conflict prevention and resolution.

### **Aspects of Globalization**

Globalization has come to mean many things to many people. In this regard, one author (Riggs, 2003) argues that “dimensions” of globalization central to the concerns of no less than seven academic disciplines can be distinguished.<sup>1</sup> Our concern here is primarily with the direct and indirect effects of what has come to be known as “economic”, “market-driven” or “neo-liberal” globalization. However, it is impossible to limit our discussion to economic processes, narrowly defined, since the same forces and enabling conditions that have led to global economic change have also facilitated change in other areas.

Specifically, economic perspectives on globalization view it to be rooted in changes in technology and production processes. The emergence of a global division of labor and a more open and less regulated world economy are viewed as its products. The ‘globalization as economics’ thesis actually has two versions, the relatively benign and the malevolent. The relatively benign thesis of globalization as economics posits that with the growing complexity of and interdependence of the world economy there are emerging centers of consumption and production that are no longer bounded by nation-states (Reich, 1991; Ohmae, 1990, 1995; Friedman, 1999). For example, middle range information technology production centers have emerged in Dublin, San Francisco, Delhi, Singapore and Sydney, and financial, human, and intellectual capital flow freely from one location to the next. Nation-states have little or no control over this movement of capital, thereby losing the ability to regulate their economies. This view to a large degree assumes globalization to be a natural and inevitable process having unintended, but generally positive, consequences.

The malevolent version of globalization as economics sees technological change and capital mobility as producing a number of undesirable effects (Castells, 1993). For instance, companies can take advantage of local conditions and move production facilities in response to changing local conditions – regardless of the impact of these changes on local populations. A factory in Indonesia may be profitable today, but less so tomorrow. Perhaps it will be moved to India or Mexico, depending upon the corporate financial ledger. Seen from this perspective, globalization is the latest stage in the development of capitalism; a stage in which freely moving capital working through multinational corporations has succeeded in imposing its priorities on nation-states and

local populations. In either case, the focus of globalization here is on economics, and it is portrayed as unidirectional.

Another strand of this literature critiques the positing of globalization as a natural and inevitable process. Some like Robert Cox (1996), critique what they call an “ideology” of globalization that presents it as inevitable and beneficial. For them this ideology underplays the unevenness of the process (which is both economically and politically driven) and the inequality between states and actors who are caught up in it (Hurrell and Woods, 1995). In reality, some peoples, localities, or institutions are more affected by globalizing forces than others. Some areas will benefit economically, others will not; certain groups will feel invaded by alien cultural forms, whereas others will be untouched. The great divide between those benefiting from globalization and those hurting from it accentuates the possibilities for conflict.

More generally, Held et al. (2000) argue that globalization creates new spatial organizations and social relations defined in terms of four key factors:

- *Extensity* is the stretching of social, political, and economic activities across frontiers and borders. An event in one region has impacts elsewhere, so for example changes in share prices in New York may lead to women in Malaysia losing their job in a shoe manufacturing plant.
- *Intensity* is more than occasional interconnectedness, as it refers to a growing number of interconnections. The number of relationships between events, institutions and people in San Francisco and Santiago, Chile are increasing.
- *Velocity* is the speed of interactions. Thus, not only is the rate at which the interconnectedness between Santiago and San Francisco increasing, but the time taken to establish connections is constantly shrinking.
- *Impact* is the deepening of extensity, intensity and velocity. Distant events have greater local consequences.

As globalization accelerates change along all four vectors, new regional and global networks of activity, interaction and the use of power come into being – in each instance creating new sets of “winner” and “losers”. The authors of this model acknowledge that globalization concerns more than economics. They recognize that its direction is not exclusively from the economically well off Western world to the poorer non-western world. Rather, anyone who can access the technology of globalization can influence the process(es).

The actors in this globalized world are diverse, and include multi-national companies, communal and religious groups, diasporas, publics, nation states, and more. In contrast to the state-centric perspective characteristic of international relations, in the study of globalization we find that the relative importance of one actor versus another varies from situation to situation, from context to context. This leads to an important insight: the conceptually interesting area in the study of globalization and conflict is the global – local interaction. Global forces may bring a new set of actors to bear on a local

situation, by facilitating the expression of a local conflict, contributing to its resolution, or even changing its character and outcome in other unpredictable ways.

The literature on conflict and globalization has shed some light on these dynamics. However, what has not received as much attention is analysis of possible links between globalization and conflict resolution and prevention. Therefore, the discussion that follows is an initial attempt to assess to what extent and in what ways globalization, conflict, and conflict resolution interact.

### **Conflict and Globalization**

Globalization may influence the expression of conflict in a number of ways, including disturbing local events, providing new resources over which to compete, and threatening deeply held values or symbols, to name a few. We have selected two cases to illustrate these connections.

One particularly troublesome example of how globalization and conflict interact can be found in the story of ‘conflict diamonds’, where diamonds are used to fund military operations. Diamonds have long been valuable commodities. In 1999 trade in raw, unpolished diamonds totaled some \$7.25 billion (Goreux, 2001:3). It is truly a globalized market. Dominated by the South African DeBeers cartel (owning some 40% of the world’s diamond mines), diamonds may be mined in southern Africa, Russia, Canada, or Australia. Raw diamonds are polished in Antwerp, London, Bombay or Dubai. Polished diamonds are then exported for sale largely in Japan or the U.S. (Goreux, 2001). It is estimated that the trade in ‘conflict diamonds’ amounts to some \$250 million. While only 3.5% of the total trade in diamonds, it represents a significant source of income for warring parties.

In Angola and Sierra Leone, the failure of the central government, insurgency campaigns, and the lack of external funding sources have combined with the access to diamond mining regions to create a disaster. In Angola, UNITA (the rebel force led by the late Jonas Savimbi, seeking to oust the current government in Luanda) lost financial support from the U.S. government, after the end of the Cold War. To replace this funding UNITA first stockpiled diamonds and then used diamond sales to fund weapons purchases, in order to continue its war. In Sierra Leone the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) has been waging war against the central government since 1991. The RUF relies upon diamond smuggling to support its military campaign. This military campaign has resulted in the death of some 10,000 to 20,000 people and seen nearly 2 million people displaced.

In a further twist, al-Qaeda is believed to use the ‘conflict diamond’ smuggling route to launder its own proceeds. It is alleged that al-Qaeda operatives purchase diamonds in Africa, export them and convert them into cash as needed (Farah, 2001:A1).

A diamond on the finger of a casualty of the attack on the World Trade Center may well have once been traded by al-Qaeda and mined by those working with the RUF.

While ‘conflict diamonds’ account for a very small portion of the total global trade in uncut diamonds, the diamonds play a central role in funding two bloody and violent conflicts. In addition, ‘conflict diamonds’ create an incentive among some to keep a place like Sierra Leone mired in violence. The global market in diamonds, interacting with the global arms trade, has impacted local conditions in Angola and Sierra Leone. In both nations the local conflicts have been fed, and new dynamics introduced.

A second example of the interplay between globalization and conflict is found in Ambon in Maluku province, Indonesia, which has been the site of sectarian violence since 1999. Unlike Sierra Leone and Angola, there is no strong separatist movement there.<sup>2</sup> Elsewhere in Indonesia there are some active separatist movements in Aceh and Irian Jaya, for example. Instead, the conflict in Maluku represents communal tensions between Muslims and Christians. Maluku, formerly the Moluccas, or Spice Islands, has been home to a large Christian population as well as Muslims. In recent years the Muslim population has grown due to internal migration. In years past, Christians received favorable treatment from colonial masters, leaving them in charge of the local bureaucracy and economy.

Conflict erupted in 1999, tapping into undercurrents and led to riots, leaving hundreds dead. Since then some 5000 have died in the ensuing violence (International Crisis Group [ICG], 2002:1). In 2002 parties to the conflict signed the Indonesian government brokered Malino II Peace Agreement, which appears (at this writing) to be shaky as there has been renewed violence in Maluku. The interplay between the forces of globalization and conflict are apparent to the observer, though they are less spectacular than in the ‘conflict diamonds’ case. In the Maluku example democratization and marketization, two prominent reform “themes” promoted worldwide by several of the leading economic and military powers in the world, interacted with local conflict dynamics.

Chua (1998) argues that democratization and marketization create the basis for provoking and heightening ethnic conflict, and her logic is equally applicable to religious as well as ethnic groups in post-colonial Indonesia. Chua’s thesis is that marketization benefits some more than others, a theme echoed by many other critics of liberal market reforms. Furthermore, in the developing world ethnically divided societies are often characterized by one ethnic group gaining politically through majority rule, while a different group gains economically. The result of this is that the group in political power is not the group with economic power, and this tends to rigidify ethnic boundaries and establish competitive relationships. According to Chua’s thesis, marketization, democratization, and ethnic division combine to create potentially explosive social conditions.

Indonesia, an ethnically divided society, has been trying to democratize since the fall of the Suharto’s New Order regime in 1998. One aspect of this program has been a

process of political decentralization. The then Indonesian Minister for Home Affairs and Regional Autonomy Surjadi Soedirdje explained that decentralization was a significant component of democratic reform in Indonesia (Soedirdje, 2000). In addition, the World Bank and various donor nations favored decentralization. Through devolving many powers to the local level and giving greater value to local elections the process of decentralization increased rivalries as local politicians vied for power. While local in effect, it is important to remember that decentralization was implemented at least in part as a response to outside influences. Marketization, including extensive privatization of ownership, is also under way in Indonesia at the urging of both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Thus, Indonesia, according to Chua's (1998) argument, had all the ingredients for heightened ethnic conflict, and this seems to be born out in the cases of Aceh, Irian Jaya, and Maluku.

Divisions have existed in Maluku for some years and are illustrated by what happened in Ambon, in Maluku. The conflict finds its roots in the divide between the largely Christian indigenous Ambonese and the largely migrant Muslim populations. While in the town of Ambon Christians are in slight majority (just over 50%), Muslims (roughly 60%) dominate the rest of Maluku (ICG, 2002). Generally, the newer Moslem populations have done better economically than historically prosperous Christian populations. In fact, there had been a general diminution of Christian prosperity and political power.

The gradual shift in political power was reinforced by developments at the national level in the 1990's as then President Soeharto attempted to mobilise Muslim support. In Maluku he appointed Muslim Ambonese governors for the first time, and Muslims obtained more positions in the local bureaucracy. After Soeharto's fall and with the approach of national and provincial elections in June 1999, political tensions rose as displaced Christians attempted to win back influence, particularly through the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia – Perjuangan (PDI-P) led nationally by Megawati Soekarnoputri (ICG, 2002:2).

By 2000 the conflict had exploded into a full-blown melee, with both sides engaged in acts of extreme violence and cruelty. One of the local messages that emerged from the conflict between Muslims and Christians was that Christians were persecuting the Muslims. As a consequence Laskar Jihad, a Java-based militia arrived in Ambon to reinforce local Muslim groups.<sup>3</sup>

Global discourse and ideologies of democratization, decentralization, and marketization have in combination made impressions upon Ambon/Maluku. While tensions may have already existed between Muslims and Christians in Ambon/Maluku, they had not yet been expressed through overt violence. However, marketization and democratization appear to have redistributed wealth and political influence in ways that widened the gulf and increased the polarization between these two communities.

Both the ‘conflict diamonds’ and Maluku cases illustrate ways in which globalization and conflict interact negatively. In these examples global market forces and international pressures for democratic and liberal economic reforms exacerbated already brewing local conflicts. We now look at globalization’s impact on conflict *resolution*, and the results are more mixed.

### **Conflict Resolution and Globalization**

The interaction between the global and the local can create unintended processes of resolution. Through creating new means or motivation for dialogue among contending parties, globalization can be a “spark” for peace. In the conflict on Bougainville, Papua New Guinea (PNG), for instance, globalization contributed both to conflict and to its resolution.

Conflict in Bougainville erupted in the late 1980’s as separatist groups in Bougainville opposed mining at Panguna, an operation owned by Conzinc RioTinto Australia or CRA (now Rio Tinto). The Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) engaged in acts of violence aimed at closing down the mine, an end they achieved. The mine was of some importance to the Papua New Guinea government in Port Moresby, in as much as it accounted for about 17% of government revenues. The mine came into being following the Bougainville Copper Agreement of 1974; this agreement created grounds for conflict in Bougainville by replacing local custom with regard to land tenure and ownership with the Australian national practice of “what’s under the ground belongs to the government”. This change effectively excluded traditional land owners from the process of regulating who used the mineral wealth of Bougainville. Other causes of the Bougainville conflict outlined by Regan (1999) include:

- Resentment of landowners over establishment of the mine and its impact on them and their physical environment;
- Inter-generational conflict among landowners near the mine over distribution of rents, compensation, and other benefits from the mine;
- Resentment among Bougainvillean employees of Bougainville Copper Ltd about perceived limited opportunities for promotion;
- Economic nationalism, or for the Bougainvillian economy to be dominated by Bougainvillians;
- Tensions caused by the collapse of cocoa prices between 1987 and 1988 (this was a society heavily dependent on small-holder cocoa production);
- Resentment of the increasing numbers of outsiders coming to Bougainville;
- Ethnicity, where there are numerous linguistic groups who vie for resources in Bougainville;
- Abuses of human rights perpetrated by members of the PNG security forces.

The outbreak of conflict led the PNG government to deploy the PNG Defence Force (PNGDF) in Bougainville. This led to bloody violence and the isolation of Bougainville by PNG. Yet, by 1996 the PNGDF was all but defeated by the BRA. In an effort to recoup their losses the PNG government of Sir Julius Chan sought to end the Bougainville conflict by using a mercenary firm, Sandline Corporation. Sandline was to go into Bougainville and impose a military solution. Upon discovery, however, MP's and the military revolted and brought down the Chan government. The event also catalyzed the BRA into taking action on seeking peace. By 1997 parties had established a sufficient level of trust to sign the Burnham Declaration, which outlines the early stages of a peace process. The New Zealand government worked with conflicting parties in Bougainville, bringing them to New Zealand for talks. The resulting Burnham Declaration was built upon with Burnham II and the Lincoln Agreement, all of which are designed to enhance trust and establish mechanisms to resolve local conflicts.

The Bougainville case is an interesting one, in as much as it demonstrates how globalization can be both an influence for conflict escalation and de-escalation. Global copper trade was surely a key dynamic in bringing out the conflict, as the Panguna mine was responsible for some 17% of PNG's revenues. While multinational business interests certainly played a role in stimulating conflict, the Sandline affair and global economics also played a role in moving the conflict from escalation to de-escalation. The Sandline affair acted as a catalyst for parties to review their positions and seek alternatives to violence; and, the fact that those on Bougainville needed an income and that the mine was probably the most prominent export industry in the area acted as incentives to make peace.

However, globalization may also interact with conflict resolution processes in negative ways, as illustrated by the case of East Timor. In a sense, the consequences of independence for East Timor were "globalized" or made relevant in capitals around the globe where secessionist movements existed, inhibiting negotiations with other separatist groups.

Viewed from a globalization frame East Timor was an economic and political drain for Indonesia, especially after the financial collapse of 1997. It could be argued that with Indonesia in financial difficulty and feeling the pressure of U.S. Congressional concerns over human rights abuses, the Habibie government took the view that giving East Timor independence would be a wise step. The Habibie government's motivation could be seen as most calculating. Indonesia would always dominate tiny East Timor both politically and economically, whereas leaving a garrison force in East Timor to maintain formal political control would have been both expensive and inefficient. The rationale for giving up East Timor became even more compelling when the international community agreed to take on the costs of creating an independent state.

The unanticipated consequence of East Timor's independence was, however, to fuel the fires of separatism in Indonesia and elsewhere. Separatists in Irian Jaya and Aceh pointed to the case of East Timor and sought to use it as an example of what could



be accomplished through resistance and violence. This somewhat perverse result exemplifies the argument made by John Maynard Keynes in 1920 in his seminal work, *The Economic Consequences of Peace*. In his analysis of the economic and political consequences of the Versailles Treaty, he demonstrated that peace generally has both positive and negative consequences: these consequences may have a far reaching impact.

Globalization may also bring about unexpected opportunities for resolution of local conflicts. In early August 1998 Australian Gas Light (AGL) announced its intention to construct a natural gas pipeline across rural Queensland in northeastern Australia. AGL's natural gas business was growing as world consumption of natural gas continued to expand. In an effort to meet both local and export demand AGL expanded its extraction activities. The proposed pipeline, however, crossed aboriginal traditional territory. In 1992 the High Court of Australia struck down the principle of *terra nullius*, in issuing their decision on *Mabo v. Queensland*; this established the legal right for indigenous people to claim traditional ownership of land.<sup>4</sup> In 1993 the Australian Labor government introduced legislation, later to become the Native Title Act of 1993. The objects of the Act were the following:

- to provide for the recognition and protection of native title; and
- to establish ways in which future dealings affecting native title may proceed and to set standards for those dealings; and
- to establish a mechanism for determining claims to native title; and
- to provide for, or permit, the validation of past acts invalidated because of the existence of native title.

In 1996 *Wik v. Queensland* found that native title may exist on pastoral leases. This decision led in turn to the Coalition government's Ten Point Plan and later authoring of the Native Title Amendment Act of 1998. This act altered the basis for native title claims, emphasizing that applications could be made on the part of a group and by those who could act as representatives of a group. Under both acts, applications to native title claims are to be negotiated. "'Negotiated agreements' (sometimes called 'negotiated settlements') come in a variety of different forms and are brought about by a number of different circumstances. As the National Native Title Tribunal described them, they 'may range from broad arrangements on a regional level to details of daily practices, such as closure of station gates and fire control'"(Doenau, 1999:7). Negotiation over native title is the essence of both the 1993 and 1998 Native Title Acts.<sup>5</sup>

The negotiations between AGL and representatives of the indigenous people occurred against the backdrop of calls for reconciliation between the Australian government and Aboriginal Australians. Specifically, calls were made by numerous indigenous groups for the government to issue an apology. A host of notable Australians, including the Governor General Sir William Deane, offered apologies.<sup>6</sup> Thus, this negotiation resulted in both a contract for a natural gas pipeline and a forward step in the reconciliation process. One indigenous negotiator commented:

The AGL pipeline ... has given Aboriginal people in this area a chance to honour those Heroes of the Dreamtime, and to return to their homelands. Though it was brief, it has awakened the Spirits of the Land and, for a time, we have REJOICED.

Now the way is paved for us to revisit our areas and gain strength in the knowledge that our Ancestors held on to our inner spirits, and the invisible string will continue to hold us to them and to our Lands (AGL internal document, undated).

The global demand for natural gas, combined with the global trend to recognize indigenous land claims, interacted with local conflict, and the result contributed to a broader process of reconciliation in Australia. Indigenous negotiators, many of whom had never interacted with European descended Australians, had won recognition for their needs. In this case, globalization acted as a catalyst for both conflict resolution and peace building.

Finally, globalization can generally bring about broader and more coordinated efforts in conflict prevention, through the expansion of information technology that links people together in action networks who were previously not able to be in regular contact with each other. Two different examples may suffice to illustrate how globalization may contribute to coordination on conflict prevention activities. In 2002 the Japan Center for Preventive Diplomacy hosted its second e-symposium on conflict prevention. The e-symposium had roughly 500 registrants from around the globe. Participants came largely from the non-government organizations (NGOs) and academic sectors. Another initiative is the Transatlantic Internet Seminar Kosovo/a and Southeastern Europe (TISKSE). This Carnegie sponsored program is designed to link participants from academia and civil society in education about conflict prevention in the Balkans. It is too early to fully evaluate these initiatives, but they already illustrate the unprecedented impact and creative influence that focused applications of information technology – one “engine” of globalization – can have in the areas of conflict resolution, peace building, and early warning.

Drawing on the examples from Bougainville, East Timor, Australia, and more generally those offered of global communication, globalization may speed or trigger resolution, may spread negative consequences of peace, and may facilitate conflict prevention coordination. It remains to assess what these findings mean for both the study and the practice of peace and conflict resolution.

### **Conclusion**

With respect to peace and conflict resolution, our examples, while not comprehensive do provide initial evidence of the complex interaction between conflict and globalization. Globalization can act to catalyze conflict in a variety of settings.

Global markets may provide under-funded and poor groups the financial means to purchase weapons. These global markets may actually help destabilize local conditions, as factions seek to exploit natural resources. The case of the ‘conflict diamonds’ is an excellent illustration of how markets can have a negative impact on local conflicts. Globalization may also introduce ideological themes into local politics. If acted upon and implemented through policy, these themes, such as marketization or democratization, may trigger ethnic and religious conflict, as in Maluku as groups vie for power and influence in a changing environment.

Conflict resolution or de-escalation also appears to be impacted by globalization. The conflict in Bougainville demonstrated how globalization can help spark interest in bringing about a peaceful resolution to conflict. Peace agreements are not without their unintended consequences. Sometimes peace agreements, while positive and just in their own right, have unintended consequences. This was demonstrated by the case of East Timor. Interestingly, globalization can also foster peaceful resolution of local issues. The case of AGL and indigenous people negotiating over access to traditional land actually helped contribute to reconciliation efforts. Finally, the global diffusion of information technology can promote greater coordination among people by linking those interested in conflict prevention in ever-broader action networks.

These findings indicate that the much talked about global “compression” of time and space occurs as much in conflict settings as in any other; and that, for reasons discussed above, they make predicting the course of conflict more complex. One cannot simply state that globalization will either escalate or de-escalate conflict. Rather, the manner in which the global and local interact must be considered on a case-by-case basis with the analyst teasing out the various interactions between them. For example, the relationship between marketization and democratization appears to be far more complex than first anticipated. While both are promoted as means to empower local populations, on the ground they may produce distinctly negative consequences. To reiterate, in this regard the problematic area is not democratization or marketization *per se*, but rather their interactions with local circumstances.

Conflict resolution processes such as negotiation, mediation, or other third party processes may also be impacted by globalization. In the Australian example negotiators from both sides took a broad view, incorporating emerging global norms about the rights of indigenous people into the settlement. However, while this approach may work in some cases, it is not always a good idea, since outside influences may introduce issues that unnecessarily complicate agendas or have unforeseen negative consequences. Therefore, conflict resolution practitioners must be careful in managing global influences (to the degree possible), as well as local conditions, in any given context.

Assuming our findings here are indicative, the issue remains of whether globalization is simply a “double-edged” sword, impacting conflict escalation and de-escalation more or less evenly; or whether it tends to foster more conflict than it resolves. This is an important question with far reaching implications for globalization discourse

and global governance. Already we are entitled to be skeptical of claims that globalization is inherently positive and benign. If it can be demonstrated to be, on balance, negative, then laissez faire is an unacceptable policy stance, and the challenge of channeling at least certain key aspects of globalization in positive directions can not long be avoided. Thus, more investigation needs to be undertaken into the complex relationship between globalization and conflict escalation and de-escalation.

### Notes

1. Economics, Political Science, Sociology, Psychology, Anthropology, Communications and Geography.
2. The RMS or Republic of South Maluku has sought separation from Indonesia, but is not a large force and has no military means.
3. The Bush Administration has linked al Qaeda in Afghanistan to Laskar Jihad. (The Asian Front, *Washington Post*, January 27, 2002: B6)
4. *Terra nullius* was the doctrine that when British settlers arrived in Australia it was regarded as empty land, therefore that land could be claimed by the Crown. The claim of *terra nullius* erased any claims the indigenous people may have made.
5. The recognition of traditional land is part of a global trend acknowledging indigenous peoples' rights to traditional land. This recognition of indigenous peoples' land rights follows on the heels of recognition of the Treaty of Waitangi between the Maori people and the European settlers of New Zealand, and in establishment of the indigenous territory Nunavut in Canada.
6. The notable exception was Prime Minister John Howard, with the Howard government holding firm on its decision not to apologize for past wrongs.

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